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4.1  Introduction 
California’s Proposition 13, passed by referendum in 1978, drastically 
changed the state’s system of local property taxation. Until 1978, sep- 
arate taxes were levied on real property by  a variety of overlapping 
governmental units-counties, local governments, school districts, and 
other local authorities. Each tax rate reflected local voters’ (or perhaps 
bureaucrats’) preferences concerning the desired level of expenditure 
on local public goods. Assessed values reflected market values and 
were rising rapidly in the late 1970s as market values rose. 
After Proposition  13, California localities essentially lost control of 
local property taxes.  First, assessed values were set at  1975 market 
value, with all assessments subsequently readjusted upward at a rate 
of  2% per year. Reassessments now occur only when properties are 
sold, at which time they are set at market value. Second, a single overall 
property  tax rate, arbitrarily set at  I%,  replaced the menu of  local 
property taxes levied by cities and towns, counties, school districts, 
and other local authorities.’ This reduced the level of  property  tax 
collections in all localities, but by varying amounts. Emergency state 
aid to local governments offset some of  the drop in property tax rev- 
enues, but at varying (and exogenously determined) levels. 
Post-Proposition  13 California provides an excellent laboratory for 
studying the effects of taxes on firm location. This is because, first, 
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local property taxes changed from being determined by  each locality 
to being uniform all over the state-thus  the tax change was imposed 
from above and was independent of the levels of local public services 
provided to firms. Second, other attributes of the business climate in 
various parts of California presumably were unaffected by Proposition 
13. Therefore the effect of the tax change on firm location patterns can 
be examined without having to correct for such factors as differential 
production or transportation costs in different California localities. These 
factors are assumed to remain unchanged. 
In this paper we use data from pre- and post-Proposition  13 California 
to test whether the changes in local property taxes have affected firm 
location patterns. The paper is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 briefly 
reviews the literature on economic models of firm location. Section 4.3 
develops various models of the effect of taxes on firm location. Section 
4.4 describes the model to be tested and presents results. 
4.2  Economic Models of Firm Location 
There is a large literature dealing with models of firm location from 
many perspectives. 
The classic approach is that of  regional scientists, who have devel- 
oped  models of firm location that stress cost  minimization or profit 
maximization when sources of inputs and markets for outputs are dis- 
persed over space at exogenously determined locations and transpor- 
tation  costs for inputs or  outputs  are nonnegligible. Wages  and the 
prices of  land, capital, and output are assumed to be fixed. This type 
of model leads to results such as that production processes that reduce 
bulk should be located near input sources, while production processes 
that increase bulk should be located near product markets.’ 
Urban economists have examined firm location patterns within cities. 
Here the locations of markets and input sources are usually assumed 
to be fixed, as are output prices, but transportation costs, land prices, 
and wages are assumed to vary inversely with the firm’s distance from 
the city  center. Typical  results  in this  literature  suggest that  firms’ 
capital/land ratios fall with greater distance from the center and that 
firms in different industries segregate themselves in rings around the 
center of the 
Neither of these approaches considers taxes as a major factor in firm 
location. This is because the effect of  spatial variation in input costs 
or in transportation costs is implicitly assumed to swamp the effect of 
tax changes over space. For most firms, total nonfederal taxes are a 
much smaller proportion of their expenditures than are wages or capital 
costs and usually are smaller than total profits. However, the absolute 
size of each cost item is potentially less important than its variability 
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Those studies of firm location that take taxes specifically into account 
are quite divided on whether taxes are important or not. For example, 
Epping (1982) surveyed manufacturing firms that either moved to Ar- 
kansas or considered but did not move to Arkansas and asked managers 
of  these firms to rank a set of factors in  order of  importance in the 
location decision. He found that taxes ranked second in importance in 
firms’ location decisions, just behind labor costs but above all other 
factors. The tax factor here presumably  included all  state and local 
taxes. not just property taxes, but still the ranking seems extraordinarily 
high. On the other hand, in an earlier and much more detailed survey 
of manufacturing firms in Cincinnati and New England that expanded, 
moved, or opened branch plants, Schmenner (1978) found taxes to be 
an infrequently cited and relatively unimportant factor in the location 
decision. Schmenner’s results suggest that purely technological con- 
siderations, such as the need to expand or modernize production fa- 
cilities, to separate different product lines, or to provide better geo- 
graphic coverage of  the  market  are most  important  in  determining 
whether plants move or not. Both taxes and labor cost considerations 
became important in his study only in the relatively rare situation when 
a relocation or a branch plant opening involved a move of  more than 
a few miles. For most  firms taxes were unimportant for the  simple 
reason that the firm did not move far enough to allow any significant 
variation. 
There have also been several econometric studies of firm location, 
which have produced equally conflicting results concerning the impor- 
tance of taxes. Carlton (1979) used Dun and Bradstreet data to explain 
the pattern of new births of firms across SMSAs in three manufacturing 
industries that ship their output long distances and therefore are not 
tied to locations near particular output markets. The explanatory fac- 
tors used included wage levels, average corporate and personal income 
tax and property tax levels, utility costs, and measures of agglomeration 
effects across SMSAs. The results indicated that neither income nor 
property taxes were a significant determinant of  new births. More re- 
cently, Bartik (1984) used Dun and Bradstreet data to estimate a model 
of branch plant location behavior across the fifty states by the Fortune 
500 companies. He found that state corporate income tax rates were 
a significant determinant of plant location behavior, but property taxes 
were not. 
A variety of econometric studies have used data from cross-sectional 
samples of local jurisdictions, usually within a single metropolitan area, 
to test whether the existing pattern or changes in the pattern of firm 
locations are explained by tax differentials across jurisdictions and a 
variety of other variables. The latter include, in various studies, mea- 
sures of  transportation facilities; distance to the central city; level of 
spending on local public services; supply of sites; energy costs; wage 86  Michelle J. White 
costs; and measures of agglomeration economies. For example, Was- 
ylenko (1981a) and Fox (1981) separately estimated a series of models 
in which they argue that supply conditions, such as whether particular 
communities zone out industrial uses, should be taken into account in 
explaining firm location. Fox found that tax variables were significant 
in  explaining the amount of  land occupied by  firms in  a sample of 
suburban jurisdictions in the Cleveland area when those communities 
that zone out industry completely  were excluded from the sample. 
Wasylenko found that property taxes were significant in  explaining 
location choice for a sample of manufacturing and wholesale trade firms 
that  moved  to  suburban jurisdiction  around  Milwaukee.  However, 
property taxes were not significant in explaining moving behavior in 
several other industrial categories4 
To the extent that these studies are consistent about anything, they 
suggest that firms are more likely to be tax sensitive in making relatively 
short-distance moves within a particular metropolitan area. In consid- 
ering these moves, other factors, such as wages, are likely to be con- 
stant at all possible locations. But since most metropolitan areas contain 
many  local jurisdictions, taxes  may  vary  at different  sites.  On the 
contrary, when  intercity  long-distance  moves  are being  considered, 
wages, transportation costs, and other factors are likely to vary widely, 
so that variations in tax liability-while  present-are  less likely to be 
important in firms’ decision making. 
A related literature (see Fischel  1975 and Ladd 1975) takes the ap- 
proach of examining whether the presence of more firms in a commu- 
nity has the effect of lowering its property tax rate, correcting for fac- 
tors that would  otherwise cause residents to have  high  demand for 
public services and therefore a higher tax rate. Both authors use data 
from communities within a single SMSA. The results of both studies 
suggest that a higher proportion of nonresidential property has a down- 
ward effect on communities’ tax rates. Ladd also argues that commer- 
cial property has a larger negative effect on the property tax rate than 
industrial property, suggesting that communities have more monopoly 
power over commercial than industrial firms. This seems reasonable 
since commercial firms’ markets are smaller and more spatially sensitive. 
Another study worthy of mention is by Grieson and his associates 
(1977). It examines the effect of a change in the form of the business 
tax in New York City from a gross receipts tax to a profits tax on the 
level of employment in the city. Since New York City taxes different 
industries at different rates, a cross-sectional study could be done within 
a single locality. Grieson and his coauthors found that manufacturing 
employment was significantly negatively related to the level of taxes, 
while nonmanufacturing employment was not. Thus only manufactur- 
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they argued that receipts from the business tax could be increased by 
lowering the rates applicable to manufacturing firms-i.e.,  New York’s 
tax rates were too high. 
Finally, a  related  literature deserves mention.  In  most  European 
countries, “regional policies” are used to give firms financial incentives 
to locate or expand in depressed regions. The incentives may include 
tax abatements, subsidized provision of sites or buildings built by gov- 
ernment  authorities,  and  wage  or training  subsidies for employees. 
Sometimes the positive incentives for firms to move to depressed areas 
are accompanied by penalties or controls on firms moving to nonde- 
pressed areas. Moore and Rhodes (1976) is an example of a study of 
the effects of British regional policy instruments. Not surprisingly, they 
find that the British combined tax-plus-regulatory regional policy does 
have significant effects on firm location patterns. 
In  the  United  States, regional policies have never been  explicitly 
adopted by the federal government, except for the Appalachia program 
of the 1960s. There has been active consideration recently of a federal 
regional policy that  would  favor depressed  central cities. Generous 
investment tax credits were enacted by Congress in 1981 for renovation 
of buildings thirty or more years old and of buildings in historic districts. 
There has also been discussion (but no action) on a program of “urban 
enterprise zones,”  which would release firms located in  specific de- 
pressed  areas from federal  minimum wage laws, the social security 
program, occupational safety and health regulation, and various taxes. 
However, states and localities have rushed in with their own policies 
to fill the federal void. They offer a wide variety of financial incentives 
for firms to move in, ranging from floating tax-exempt industrial rev- 
enue bonds to using federal community development funds in  ways 
that benefit firms to abating firms’ property taxes. What has emerged 
is in effect an uncoordinated, ad hoc regional policy in  which states 
and cities compete for firms by offering, primarily, subsidies from the 
federal government attractively packaged by  the states and, second- 
arily, state or local subsidies in the form of direct tax abatements. It 
would be of  interest to compare the results of these  state programs 
with those of  the European regional policies, but thus far no one has 
even studied the various U.S.  policies in  a consistent way. 
Thus the literature on whether taxes affect firm location patterns 
shows little sign of general agreement on whether taxes are important 
or not. 
4.3  Theories 
In this section I  explore several theories of  the effect of property 
taxes on location choice by firms. 88  Michelle J. White 
4.3.1  The Pure Tax Approach 
A rather simplistic view of the firm location problem starts with the 
assumption that property taxes (or any taxes) levied on firms are pure 
taxes, unrelated  to the level of  public goods or services provided by 
the governmental unit that levies the tax. This might be the case, for 
example, if  the public goods provided  by  local governments benefit 
only households, but are financed by  taxes on both households and 
firms. Alternatively, local public goods could benefit both  firms and 
households, but the mix of  residential versus business property may 
differ across communities. In either case, the taxes paid by firms would 
be unrelated to the level of services received by firms. 
Assume also that localities do not (or cannot) engage in direct reg- 
ulation of land use patterns, i.e., there is no zoning. And assume that 
production costs for firms in  any industry are invariant over space. 
This means, first, that transport costs of inputs and outputs remain the 
same regardless of the firm’s location, perhaps because its output is 
exported and it always hires local workers whose wages are constant 
everywhere. Second, it means that direct production costs are constant 
over space. Thus, for example, the firm cannot reduce its waste disposal 
costs by locating on a riverbank site, either because no river exists in 
the region or because there is a system of pollution charges equal to 
marginal benefit levied on users of the river. 
Firms in this model have incentives to move to those communities 
having the lowest (equalized) property tax rates. The higher the com- 
munity’s tax rate, the greater the incentive firms have to move out. 
Now consider the issue of  capitalization: i.e., do differences in land 
prices across communities compensate for differences in the level of 
taxes paid by firms? In the simple model depicted here, the answer is 
probably that differences in land prices would compensate for at least 
part of the variation in tax liability faced by  firms in different com- 
munities. This means that high taxes in a community should have less 
of a discouraging effect on firms locating there than would appear if 
land prices were assumed to be unaffected by fiscal variables. However, 
even with capitalization, taxes will still have some locational effects. 
First, if firms value the public services provided by local communities, 
then they would be attracted to communities having desirable service 
menus even if taxes were higher there. This would partially offset the 
capitalization of taxes. Second, capitalization may cause sites in par- 
ticular communities  to become  unavailable or unattractive  to firms, 
either because land values fall to zero without fully compensating firms 
for higher taxes in that community or because high taxes on firms allow 
residential or other users that are subject to lower taxes to outbid firms 
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changes in land prices, by  substituting capital for land if  land values 
rise or by moving out entirely. The more elastic is firms’ demand for 
land for any reason, the less capitalization can be expected to occur. 
A final problem with the capitalization story is that firms have a long- 
time perspective in making location decisions. While capitalization may 
insulate them from existing tax differentials, it may not insulate them 
from future changes in taxes. Thus firms may avoid high tax areas if 
they feel that high taxes now increase the probability of high tax in- 
creases later. While some firms that are renters may be able to avoid 
paying future property  tax increases, the usual  lease arrangement is 
likely to allow a pass-through  of property tax increases, leaving the 
renter firm paying a tax increase but getting no offsetting rent reduction. 
Owner firms are negatively affected by both higher tax payments and 
capital losses if  property taxes rise. 
Now suppose that a Proposition 13-type  change occurs that reduces 
or eliminates the variance of property taxes across the state. Assume 
that the change was unanticipated and that the level of benefits provided 
to firms remains unrelated to taxes paid. With no capitalization, firms’ 
location incentives would change: previously high tax localities would 
become relatively more attractive, since taxes have fallen, and previ- 
ously low tax localities would become relatively less attractive, since 
taxes have fallen by less or have risen. In this model we expect that 
firms in all industries would react in the same way to tax changes. 
Suppose now that transportation and/or production  costs do vary 
over space, but that there is still no capitalization.  In this case firms 
are attracted to low tax jurisdictions, but the attraction is now weighed 
against other cost factors such as higher-than-average transportation 
or land costs, if these apply. The effects of a Proposition 13-type change 
are the same in this context as  in the simpler case  just discussed, except 
that they are more discontinuous. For example, a tax decrease due to 
Proposition  13 that is not great enough to offset a locality’s cost dis- 
advantage because of high transportation costs will not cause firms to 
move  there.  But a  tax decrease in  a different  locality  having  good 
transportation facilities may cause firms to move in. 
Finally, what if capitalization is again introduced? If property values in 
different communities previously capitalized variations in tax levels, then 
Proposition  13 will  wipe out these differentials, leaving only production 
and transportation cost differences determining land values. With capital- 
ization, firms located in previously high-tax communities will pay lower 
taxes but higher rents, and firms located in previously low-tax communi- 
ties will pay the same or lower taxes and rents. But if rents are fixed by 
long-term contracts while taxes vary, then previously high tax communi- 
ties will still become more desirable locations relative to previously low- 
tax communities, as long as the existing leases remain in force. 90  Michelle J. White 
4.3.2  A Tiebout Theory of Firm Location 
The theory discussed above assumes that the level of property taxes 
in  any jurisdiction is independent of  the level of  the public services 
provided. The opposite approach assumes that property taxes are lev- 
ied by local governments providing public services and that local taxes 
are the sole or a major source of revenue used to finance public services. 
From the viewpoint of  local residents, a change such as Proposition 
13, which forces uniformity of property tax levels, will also force changes 
in the level of  public services provided. This results merely from the 
arithmetic of balancing budgets for local governments. However, from 
the viewpoint of firms, whose contribution to the overall revenues and 
expenditures of local governments is likely to be small, simple consid- 
erations of arithmetic play a smaller role. However, competition across 
communities may nevertheless force local governments to change the 
levels of  public service provided to firms when tax revenues change. 
The assumption of  intercommunity  competition providing a link be- 
tween  local taxes and expenditures stems from the work of  Tiebout 
(1  956). 
Suppose community i contains ni households and has average (equal- 
ized) assessed value per housing unit ofG. Suppose it also contains 
m,  firms in industry j  having average (equalized) assessed value per 
firm of  Ej. Suppose the community’s tax rate before Proposition  13 
was ti. Then total property tax revenues, Ti,  equal to total expenditures 
on local public services are 
In this context, the immediate effect of Proposition  13 is to replace 
fj with a fixed statewide property tax rate, i, which is less than any  ri 
value. If n;, a,  mji, and Ey  remain the same, then expenditures on public 
services increase or decrease by  (ti -  0/ti  or by T~  percent. But changes 
in expenditure levels may affect firms versus households in the same 
locality differently. 
Local public services vary between those that are more or less Sa- 
muelsonian  public goods  and  benefit  all  households and firms  in  a 
community (roads are an example), and those that are more or less 
private goods provided to individual households or firms (trash collec- 
tion is an example). Services in the latter category may be provided 
only to households (education) or only to firms (special police protec- 
tion). Thus an increase or decrease in the local tax rate of  T;  percent 
could cause services to firms to rise or fall by the same percentage as 
services to households-if,  for example, all local public services were 
Samuelsonian or all were private but the share of expenditures devoted 91  Property Taxes and Firm Location 
to services to firms remained  unchanged.  In  either of  these  cases, 
offsetting changes in taxing and spending levels would tend to have 
little effect on the relative attractiveness of different localities, partic- 
ularly if firms can offset changes in public service levels by increasing 
or decreasing their use of private services that substitute for publicly 
provided goods. An example of this might be firms using more private 
security guards if police protection is cut back.5 
However, the share of  expenditures devoted  to services to firms 
versus households may change if  tax rates change. One possibility is 
that changes in tax revenues-up  or down-will  mostly be absorbed 
by changes in the level of such services as education, parks, and rec- 
reation, which benefit households. Services such as roads, police, and 
fire  protection,  which benefit firms, are less likely to be cut if  tax 
revenues fall or to be raised if  revenues rise. In this case, if  a change 
such as Proposition  13 causes a  community’s tax  rate  to fall by  T~ 
percent, then firms’ tax payments will fall by T~ percent but the value 
of  services provided  to them will fall by  less. Thus the tax price of 
local public services in that community will fall and firms will have an 
incentive to move there. Conversely, if  the change causes a commu- 
nity’s tax rate to rise by 7i  percent, then firms’ tax payments will rise 
by  T~  percent, but the value of services provided to them will rise by 
less. Thus the tax price of local services will rise and firms will have 
an incentive to move out. In this scenario, Proposition  13 will cause 
previously high-tax communities to become relatively more attractive 
to firms, while previously low-tax communities will become relatively 
less attractive to firms. 
Other possibilities also exist. Communities might prefer to cut back 
services to firms rather than households, because the tax price to firms 
of substituting private for public goods is more favorable than that for 
households, For  example, firms can deduct from taxable profits the 
cost of  either paying higher property taxes to finance a larger police 
force or paying the salary of a private security guard if police protection 
is cut back. But households cannot deduct the cost of summer camp 
for their children if  cutbacks in property taxes (which are deductible 
for households that itemize) cause summer public  school classes to 
disappear. This suggests a tax incentive for communities to cut back 
services to firms if property tax revenues fall and not increase services 
to firms if  property  tax  revenues  rise.  However  some services are 
difficult to cut-either because they are Samuelsonian public goods or 
because there are no private services that can be substituted for public 
goods. 
I have shown that a Proposition 13-type change in a Tiebout context 
is likely to cause offsetting changes in local tax and expenditure levels. 
If the changes offset each other completely, then firms will have little 92  Michelle J. White 
or no incentive to move. If they offset each other but not completely, 
then firms will have an incentive to  move to  communities having a more 
favorable tax price per unit of public  services and away from com- 
munities whose tax price rises. In this case, however, location effects 
are of  second-order importance  and incentives for firms to move are 
likely to be quite muted. 
4.3.3  A Tiebout Theory of Firm Location with Zoning 
In actuality, local governments exert much more direct control over 
firms’ location choice than by setting the tax price for public goods. 
Zoning  is often used  to set aside areas where firms  can locate and 
zoning maps are often quite specific concerning which types of firms 
are allowed in which zones. Firms may be excluded completely if they 
generate excessive noise or traffic  or emit pollutants  above a  fixed 
standard. Buffer  strips or extensive landscaping may be required  of 
firms permitted  to enter. Communities wishing to exclude particular 
firms or all firms may refuse to grant  sewer permits or may  require 
bribes of various sorts in return for zoning variances. Certain types of 
firms may be excluded regardless of circumstances. Wealthy commu- 
nities may exclude all types of firms, preferring a completely residential 
environment.  Bargaining on a case by case basis is often the rule. 
Fischel (1975) and White (1975a and 1975b) have developed models 
in which there is intercommunity competition for firms, similar to that 
for high-income households. Communities are willing to accept firms 
as long as the property taxes paid by a new firm equal the sum of (1) 
the marginal cost to the community of supplying local public services 
to the firm and (2) the value to residents of the loss in environmental 
amenities due to the firm locating there. Communities are assumed to 
be willing to allow firms to enter as long as their tax payments equal 
or exceed this level. Intercommunity competition  should drive taxes 
down to equality with marginal public service plus amenity costs, ex- 
cept that communities  having  monopoly  control of  some scarce re- 
source will receive taxes greater than this level. In this scenario, when 
communities admit firms, their residents are compensated for the neg- 
ative environmental impact by enjoying a lower price per unit of local 
public goods. 
There are two variants on this theme. In the first, property taxes are 
individually negotiated with each firm and bear no relation to the market 
value of property used by the firm. In the second, discussed in the next 
section below, property taxes are levied on the actual value of property 
used by the firm. 
Suppose that a particular firm in industry j wishes to locate in com- 
munity i.  The value of its environmental or disamenity effect is EU per 
year. The marginal cost of public services provided to the firm is C,,. 93  Property Taxes and Firm Location 
Then to allow the firm to enter, the community will demand a yearly 
tax payment of T, >E,  + C,.  If  there is intercommunity competition 
for firms, T, will be driven down to equality with E, + C,. 
In this context, each community’s property tax rate is determined 
by  the requirement  of  a  balanced  budget  relating the community’s 
property tax revenues to its overall expenditures. This tax rate, ti, by 
assumption must be applied uniformly to both residential and business 
property. Therefore to raise tax revenues T,  from firmj, the tax assessor 
in community i sets a taxable value on the firm’s capital (building) plus 
land of F,,  where 
(2)  F, = T,/ti 2 (E, + Cij)/ti. 
Fij  will generally differ from the actual market value of capital and land 
used by the firm. 
Under these assumptions, the property tax is actually a bribe  in 
disguise, related only in  a formal way to the firm’s use of property. 
Here the form of the tax has no deterrent effect on any particular firm 
entering any particular community. However, the determination of E, 
and C, will depend on many factors, including  the number of firms 
already in the community, the community’s income level and its char- 
acter, the amount of vacant land in the community, and what public 
services the community provides to the firm. For particular types of 
firms, E, will be higher for high-income communities and is likely to 
rise at an increasing rate as the number of firms in a community rises. 
But E, may be lower if  the community has vacant land, so that firms 
can be buffered from nearby residents. Finally, note that E, may be 
zero (or even negative) for particular  communities.  An extreme ex- 
ample is provided by the Asarco plant in the state of Washington, where 
use of asbestos endangers the health of local residents, but the com- 
munity nonetheless  opposes closing down the plant because the jobs 
it provides are valued. 
In this scenario, high-income communities will admit only nonpol- 
luting firms, such as office or research facilities or perhaps shopping 
malls. Since E, is higher in general in high-income than in low-income 
communities, all firms (including nonpolluting firms) will tend to  prefer 
to locate in low-income communities.  Exceptions to this rule would 
occur only if  particular  firms had  lower production  costs or higher 
revenues in high-income communities. Examples might be stores sell- 
ing luxury goods, which value proximity to high-income customers, or 
office or research operations that value short commuting trips for their 
high-income workers. 
How would a Proposition  13 change location incentives in this type 
of model? If Proposition 13 only changed tax rates from ti to a uniform 
f, then communities could reestablish  the previous level of tax pay- 94  Michelle J. White 
ments  merely  by  setting  a  new  assessed  value  for  each  firm, Fur, 
where 
(3)  F,‘  = T,If 3 (E, + CJi. 
In this case the same tax revenues would be collected from firmj  by 
community i, with a higher assessed value offsetting a lower tax rate. 
However, Proposition  13 also mandated a system of  market value 
assessment (actually  1975 market value rising at 2%  per year or the 
most recent sale price) for all properties. This latter provision causes 
problems for communities. With assessed value now set equal to market 
value, Fr,  firm i in communityj  pays property taxes equal to iFr. For 
particular firms, the new property tax payment will differ little if  any 
across communities, since only differences in the value of land or the 
capital/land ratio can cause variation in tax liability. 
The firm’s new level of property taxes differs from the old payment, 
Tij, by 
(4)  GFY  - tiF,>/tiFij, 
in percentage terms. 
For particular firms, the new level of tax liability can be either higher 
or lower than the old. Under Proposition  13, the property tax rate fell 
for all counties, i.e., f < ti for all i.  (See the discussion below of table 
4.1.) However, the relation between pre-Proposition  13 F, and post- 
Proposition  13 FY  is more  difficult to predict.  Fii would tend  to be 
higher for firms with more adverse environmental effects, for firms 
receiving higher levels of  public  services, for firms in communities 
with lower property  tax  rates,  or for firms using little  land  and/or 
capital. For firms in these situations, property tax payments fall after 
Proposition 13. For other firms, however, Fr  may exceed F,,  in which 
case property tax payments could either rise or fall. Thus communities’ 
tax revenues from firms could either rise or fall as a result of Propo- 
sition 13. 
I have shown that Proposition 13 caused communities to incur wind- 
falls on property  tax  receipts from firms. These windfalls could be 
positive or negative. Since the pre-Proposition  13 system of setting an 
artificial assessed value on different firms to generate the correct bribe 
cannot be reestablished, communities and firms in this case are thrown 
out of  equilibrium by  Proposition  13. They are likely, therefore, to 
engage in nonmarket means of persuasion to move toward a new equi- 
librium. Communities may apply pressure selectively to firms that are 
now paying taxes less than Eii + C, either to reduce their pollution 
levels or to move out. Firms paying taxes greater than E, + C, may 
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site. As an alternative, they may threaten to move. Communities may 
impose new user fees on firms already there and development fees on 
firms seeking to move in. They may also use zoning variances, building 
code regulations, and building inspections more or less rigorously than 
before, depending on whether the community wants to encourage new 
firms to enter or existing firms to leave. Thus nonmarket mechanisms 
are likely to become more important as  the firm location pattern moves 
toward its new post-Proposition  13 equilibrium. 
4.3.4  A Tiebout Theory of Firm Location with Pollution and Market 
Value Assessment 
Now change the assumptions concerning how property taxes paid 
by firms are determined. Suppose in particular that communities are 
forced to assess and tax firm property at market value. Then the value 
of firmj’s  property in community  i, F?,  is exogenously determined. In 
the pre-Proposition  13 world, the tax revenue received by community 
i is ti  Fr.  In this case, communities have an incentive to use their zoning 
power to select particular  types of  firms.  Assume that communities 
compete for firms based on their marginal disamenity costs. Also as- 
sume that the marginal cost of local public goods supplied to firms is 
zero, i.e., C, = 0. 
Firms are now assumed to use land (Lj),  capital (Kj),  and environment 
(Ej)  to produce their output (Qj).  Rather than follow the usual approach 
of viewing, say, smoke emissions as a joint product with output of the 
firm’s production  process, I instead treat the environmental amenity 
level as  an input in the production process. In other words, environment 
is used up at varying rates per unit of output by different types of firms. 
Suppose each community levies a property tax on the firm which is 
intended to compensate residents for loss of environmental quality. 
Assume that each community sets a constant per unit price, 0;,  as its 
opportunity cost of environmental quality loss per unit of the input Ej. 
0; will be higher for wealthier communities or those for which there is 
inelastic demand for land. The community wishes to raise property tax 
revenues from firm j  equal to the opportunity cost of environmental 
quality loss due to the firm. Thus 
If each community has a predetermined, fixed property tax rate, r;, 
then it can only raise taxes equal to  O,Ej from the firm if the community’s 
tax rate ri equals the value of  the loss of environmental quality caused 
by the firm divided by the market value of the firm’s land plus capital 
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where pL  and pK  are (constant) prices per unit of land and capital. 
This means that firms in a metropolitan  area will  tend to locate in 
different communities depending on the relationship between firms’ use 
of the environment relative to other private inputs versus the commu- 
nity’s tax rate. Firms making relatively intensive use of the environment 
will tend to locate in high-tax-rate communities, while firms having little 
or no polluting effect will  locate in low-tax-rate communities. In this 
model, each community is predicted to contain firms in only one or a 
few industries.  Further, firms  having extremely high pollution  levels 
may not be able to find any community willing to admit them unless 
they introduce pollution controls, while very clean firms may pay prop- 
erty taxes in excess of 0,E, even in the lowest-tax-rate community. 
For the Cobb-Douglas production function, Qj =  EuiLQK’  -*j-pj,  the 
resulting stratification effect is quite straightforward.  In this case, equa- 
tion (6) becomes 
(7)  ri  = aj/(  1 - aj). 
Thus firms stratify across communities depending only on the com- 
munity’s tax rate and the firm’s level of aj. Firms in industries with 
higher aj values locate in communities with higher tax rates. Here firm 
location can be predicted simply by ranking communities by their tax 
rates and firms by the aj  value pertaining to that industry. 
Now  suppose Proposition  13 again replaces the set of community 
tax rates rj with a uniform tax rate f.  Communities have now lost both 
degrees of freedom in taxing firms-they  can vary neither FF  nor f.  All 
firms using property of market value F;  must pay the same amount in 
property  taxes regardless  of  where they locate. The change  in  tax 
revenues received by community i from firmj  is (in percentage terms) 
7;  = (f -  [;)/ti. This differs from the change in tax revenues under the 
negotiated  property  tax system. Since i  is less than  ti  for all commu- 
nities,  property  tax payments by  all firms  fall, although by varying 
amounts. Since high-income communities generally have lower prop- 
erty tax rates than  low-income  communities, the latter are likely to 
suffer larger losses of property tax revenues from firms as a result of 
the Proposition 13-mandated  reduction in  f;. 
The relocation incentives of firms in this situation are again difficult 
to predict. First, the stratification effect described above should grad- 
ually disappear, with firms in different industries no longer tending to 
segregate themselves in particular communities. Second, communities 
generally  are likely to exert direct pressure on firms, by cutting ser- 
vices, by forcing them to reduce pollution, or by encouraging them to 
move out. Finally, low-income communities are likely to become rel- 97  Property Taxes and Firm Location 
atively more attractive to firms, both because their property tax rates 
have fallen the most and because these communities  have low Bi values. 
To summarize this section, we have postulated several theories that 
predict quite different firm location effects as a result of Proposition 
13. First, the pure tax approach predicted that firms would react to the 
change by moving into communities whose tax rate decreased the most 
and out of communities whose tax rate rose or fell by relatively small 
amounts. In  this  model, the prediction  is  the same for firms  in  all 
industries. 
Second, the Tiebout theory of firm location predicted  that the lo- 
cation effects of Proposition  13 would be much weaker. Here tax re- 
ductions are likely to be offset  by reductions in  the level  of public 
services provided.  If  these two effects offset each other, then firms 
have no incentive to move. If the tax reduction is larger or smaller than 
the value of the service reduction, then firms have incentives to move 
toward (away from) communities whose tax per unit of public service 
has fallen (risen) the most. However, relocation incentives are second 
order here and any effects are likely to be small. 
Third, the Tiebout theory of firm location under zoning suggests that, 
after Proposition 13, communities will incur positive or negative wind- 
falls vis-a-vis firms within their boundaries, since tax revenues will rise 
or fall  relative to firms'  environmental amenity  and marginal public 
service  cost. This means that communities will exert selective pressures 
on firms to move out and/or may encourage other firms to move in. 
The effects are likely to differ by industry, with the environmentally 
worst  firms under the most pressure to relocate. Also, communities 
whose tax revenues from firms have fallen the most are likely to exert 
nonmarket pressures on all firms within  their boundaries. But  such 
pressures may be difficult  to detect, since they  could take the form 
either of firms moving out or of firms abating their adverse environ- 
mental effects. In general, the effects of Proposition 13 under the zoning 
model will differ by type of firm and type of community. 
4.4  Estimation 
The basic specification of the model to be tested is: 
(8)  A, = (Y  +PAtj + yA,,j  + 6Ei,,-i  + +TIRi  + E,, 
where A,  is the percent change in a measure of the activity level of 
firms in thejth industry in the ith locality between 1977 and 1981 and 
Ati is the change in the property tax rate in locality i during the same 
period. eij  is the error term. (The other variables are discussed below.) 
P can thus be interpreted as the percent change in  activity  per one 
percentage point change in the tax rate. It is expected to have a negative 98  Michelle J. White 
sign. For example, if  p  =  -5,  then a reduction in the property tax 
rate from 2%  before Proposition  13 to  1%  after would be associated 
with a 5%  increase in the level of firm activity, or from, say, 100 firms 
before to 105  firms after. 
Because of the variety of theories posited above concerning com- 
munities’ and firms’ responses to changes in the property tax structure, 
the tax coefficient p in (8) is subject to a variety of interpretations. If 
capitalization  is important,  then  p measures  firms’ response  to tax 
changes net of  capitalization. If  zoning policies by  communities are 
important, then the tax change is likely to be correlated with the strength 
of communities’ zoning response. Then p will measure the combined 
effects of property tax changes under Proposition  13 and the resulting 
changes in communities’ zoning policies. Finally, if public service levels 
provided  to firms change as a result  of Proposition  13, then  p will 
measure the net effect on firm activity of tax and service level changes. 
(I attempt to correct for the latter by introducing a measure of fiscal 
sensitivity to property tax revenues directly-see  below.) 
The data used to measure firm activity A,  are countywide and come 
from County Business Patterns (CBP).6 For each SIC code, CBP data 
are available concerning the number of firms in the county, total number 
of employees, and total yearly payroll. Equation (8) is estimated sep- 
arately for each of these three activity measures. CBP data have the 
advantage that  they  measure  all  sources of  change in  firm  activity 
levels: expansions, contractions, relocations, and firm births and deaths 
are all included. Data from two-digit SIC codes (broad industrial clas- 
sifications) are used, since the more disaggregated four-digit SIC codes 
contain many zero values for individual counties. The sample of SIC 
codes used contains manufacturing firms, firms in transportation and 
communications, firms providing financial services, firms in wholesale 
and retail trade, construction, and the service sectors. Primary indus- 
tries (mining, farming) are excluded on the grounds that they are spa- 
tially tied. Also government industries such as the Postal Service and 
education and social services are excluded  since public property  is 
exempt from the property tax. The years used were 1977, the last year 
before Proposition  13 took effect, and 1981, the most recent year for 
which  CBP data are available.  Table 4.1  gives mean  values  for all 
variables and table 4.2 lists the set of SIC codes used. 
Countywide average property tax rates and assessed value/market 
value ratios for 1977 were obtained from the State Board of  Equali- 
zation, state of California, for thirty of California’s fifty counties.’ The 
resulting equalized property tax rates for each county are given in table 
4.3  for 1977.8 Since Proposition  13, the Board has not attempted to 
construct average assessed/market value ratios for counties. These can 
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Table 4.1  Means and Standard Deviations of  Variables 
Manufacturing  Retailing/Services 
Standard  Standard 
Mean  deviation  Mean  deviation 
Proportional change 
in number of firms, 
1977-81,  California 
counties 
Proportional change 
in number of 
employees,  1977- 
8 1, California 
counties 
in  payroll,  1977-81, 
California counties 
Proportional changes 
in number of firms, 
1977-81,  U.S. 
Proportional change 















,079  ,258 
,355  .9  11 
,817  1.19 
,021  .073 
,095  ,284 
,359  .559 
.770  ,878 
.024  ,116 
,042  ,074  ,207  .I64 
,427  .I13  .588  .215 
.226  .09  1  .229  .086 
,383  ,058  ,379  .056 
appreciation or varying rates of turnover since 1978. However, from 
the point of view of a firm considering relocating to or within California, 
this omission does not seem to be a serious problem.  If the firm pur- 
chases property,  then the sale value  will become the new  assessed 
value, while if the firm rents property, then the rent level will capitalize 
any tax savings from a lower assessed value. In either case, the (perhaps 
implicit) property tax liability faced  by  a relocating  firm  should be 
constant anywhere in California. 
The (uniform) tax rate used for 1981 was 1.144%.9 Changes in tax 
rates for individual counties after Proposition 13 are also given in table 
4.3.  The sample thus consists of thirty counties times fifty-four SIC 100  Michelle J. White 





food and kindred products 
tobacco manufacturers 
textile mill products 
2300 
2500  furniture and fixtures 
2700  printing and publishing 
2800  chemicals and allied products 
2900  petroleum and coal products 
3000 
3  100  leather products 
3200 
3300  primary metal products 
3400  fabricated metal products 
3500  machinery, except electrical 
3600  electric and electronic equipment 
3700  transportation equipment 
3800  instruments and related products 
3900  miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
apparel and other textile products 
rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 
stone, clay and glass products 
Retail and wholesale trade, services, transportation, construction 
4200  trucking and warehousing 
4500  transportation by  air 
4700  transportation services 
4800  communication 
5000 
5100 
wholesale trade4urable goods 
wholesale trade-nondurable  goods 
5200 
5300  general merchandise stores 
5400  food stores 
5500 
5600  apparel and accessory stores 
5700 
5 800 
5900  miscellaneous retail 
building materials and garden supplies 
automotive dealers and service stations 
furniture and home furnishings stores 










credit agencies other than banks 
security, commodity brokers and services 
insurance carriers 
insurance agents, brokers, and service 
real estate 
combined real estate, insurance 
holding and other investment offices 
7000 
7200  personal services 
7300  business services 
7500 
7600  miscellaneous repair services 
hotels and other lodging places 
auto repair, services, and garages 101  Property Taxes and Firm Location 
Table 4.2  (continued) 
Retail and wholesale trade, services, transportation, construction 
~~ 
7800  motion pictures 
7900  amusement and recreation services 
8100  legal services 
8900  miscellaneous services 
1500  general building contractors 
1600  heavy building contractors 
1700  special trade contractors 
codes. Eliminating observations for which the activity  measure was 
zero or missing in either 1977 or 1981, the actual sample size used in 
the regressions is 1156 observations. 
Several other variables were also used in the estimations. First, the 
period  1977-81  was one of  recession in many industries. To  correct 
for overall  macroeconomic  trends  in  each  industry,  I  introduce  the 
variable AUs,,,  the percent change in activity nationally in industry j. 
Activity nationally is measured by  the same three variables over the 
same time period as are used in constructing At,, except that the U.S. 
summary of the County Business Pattern data is used. (Thus when the 
percent change in number of  firms in county i in industryj is being 
explained, the recession correction variable is the percent change in 
number of firms in the United States in industryj  and similarly for the 
other two activity measures.) Note that if the coefficient ofAus.J  equals 
one, then activity in county i in industryj  has increased or decreased 
since 1977 at the same rate as it did nationally. 
Second,  to allow for differences  in  the  rate  of  overall  economic 
growth of different localities,  which may  be correlated over time,  I 
introduce the variable E,,t-  1, the rate of increase in the employed labor 
force in county i over the period before the adoption of  Proposition 
13. El,,-, is measured for the years  1973-77  and is also taken from 
County Business Patterns. 
Finally, in an attempt to measure how the provision of local public 
services has been affected by the adoption of Proposition  13, we used 
as an additional variable the ratio of  property tax revenues to total 
revenues in 1977. This variable, denoted T/Ri,  was intended to measure 
the sensitivity of different areas’ fiscal structure to reductions in prop- 
erty tax revenue. Higher values of this variable would indicate greater 
likelihood of  extensive service reductions following Proposition  13. 
To  the extent  that  firms are attracted  to areas where  better public 
services are provided (holding firms’ own taxes constant), higher values 
of T/R,  would discourage firms from locating there. The data are taken 
from the 1977 Census of Governments and are listed in table 4.3.’O 102  Michelle J. White 
Table 4.3  Equalized Property Tax  Rates in Thirty California Counties and 
the Ratio of  Property Tax Revenues to Total Government 
Revenues 
1977 equalized  Percent change  1977 property taxes/ 

































































-  55Yc 
-  27% 
-  48% 
-  34% 
-11% 
-  15% 
-  47% 
-  39% 
-  38% 
-  34% 
-  29% 
-  23% 
-  36% 
-41% 
-  50% 
-  46% 
-  37% 
-  43% 
-  45% 
16% 
-  25% 
-  25% 
-  42% 
-  42% 
-  39% 
-  42% 
-  40% 
-  25% 
-  42% 
43% 


































The relationship between the number of employees and the payroll 
measures of firm activity allows investigation of the issue of  whether 
property tax changes cause offsetting changes in wage levels. Suppose 
we denote the first activity measure (number of firms) asAk, the second 
activity measure (number of employees) as A& and the third activity 
measure (payroll) as A;.  Then we have 
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where N2  and N,  are number of  employees in  1981 and 1977, respec- 
tively, and w2 and wl.  are wage rates in  1981  and 1977, respectively. 
The i andj  subscripts have been dropped temporarily. From (8), we 
have dkldAt = P2  and d3/aAt = P3,  where P2  and P3  are the coefficients 
of At in the equations explaining number of employees and payroll. We 
can differentiate (9) and (lo), assuming that wl,  N,,  and t,  are fixed 
and defining At as t2 - tl.  Substituting, we get a relationship between 
the estimated effects of the property tax change on number of workers 
and payroll and the implied effect of the tax change on wage rates, or: 
where q is the percent change in wz  (post-Proposition  13 wage rates) 
per percentage point change in the property tax rate. Thus by estimating 
equation (8) for the number of  employees and payroll  measures of 
activity, we can indirectly examine whether there were wage capital- 
ization effects of Proposition  13. 
The  theories discussed above suggest that responsiveness to property 
tax changes might differ for firms in different types of industries. In 
particular, if zoning is an important factor in firms’ location decisions, 
then firms in polluting industries may have very restricted options since 
they are excluded from many localities. These firms are less likely to 
react to the change in property taxes. Other firms will be more or less 
welcome  in  their pre-Proposition  13 locations after the change, de- 
pending on whether their new levels of property tax payments exceed 
or fall short of their disamenity plus local public service costs. Also, 
retailing firms and service firms face a different problem in moving from 
manufacturing firms, since their markets are spatially defined. If they 
move, they must develop a new customer base. On the other hand, 
these firms often have little invested capital, which makes moving easier 
for them than for firms with a more substantial capital investment. 
To investigate these issues, the sample was subdivided into two groups: 
manufacturing firms and firms in retail trade and services. The latter 
group also includes firms in construction, transportation, and wholesale 
trade. (See table 4.2.) Equation (8) was estimated for the entire sample 
and for each subsample; in each case for all three activity measures. 
Chow tests on all three activity measures rejected the hypothesis of a 
common relationship; therefore only the separate results for the two 
subsamples are reported. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 give the results.  Examining the results  for the 
property tax variable, Ati, its sign is consistently  negative (except in 
the regression explaining changes in the number of manufacturing firms). 
It is significantly negative in all three regressions  explaining service 
and  retailing  activity, but is never significant in  the regressions  ex- 
plaining manufacturing activity. Thus the results provide support for 104  Michelle J. White 
Table 4.4  Regression Results Explaining Firm Activity Levels in California- 
Manufacturing Sectors 
Activity measure (A,,) 
Percent change  Percent change  Percent 
in number of  in number of  change 
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(1.15) 




NOTE: Standard errors are in  parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance  at the 95% 
level. 
the hypothesis that property taxes are a significant determinant of the 
level of firm activity for retailing and service firms, but not for man- 
ufacturing firms.  In the retailing-services  sector, a property tax de- 
crease of one percentage point (which is close to the average impact 
of Proposition  13) causes an increase of about 6% in the number of 
firms, an increase of 6% in  employment, and an increase of  15%  in 
payroll. The results here thus do not support the usual presumption in 
the literature that manufacturing firms are more tax sensitive and foot- 
loose than retailing or service firms. While the coefficients of Ari are 
of similar magnitude in the regressions explaining the number of em- 
ployees and payroll for manufacturing firms, they are never significant. 
We can use these results and information in table 4.1 to calculate the 
wage capitalization effect described in equation (12) for the retailing- 
services sector. Substituting  and  using  the values "IN2 =  .74 and 
wlNllw2N2  =  .56. we find that q = -  1.7. Thus the same one-per- 
centage-point decrease in the property tax rate implies an increase in 
wage rates of about 1.7%. Part of  the benefit from the property tax 
reduction thus goes to workers in the form of higher wages. 
The other variables have the expected signs and are generally sig- 
nificant.  Both  sets of regressions  have elasticities of firm activity in 
California with respect to changes in activity nationally which are con- 10.5  Property Taxes and Firm Location 
Table 4.5  Regression Results Explaining Firm Activity Levels in California- 
Service and Retail Sectors 
Activity measure (A,) 
Percent change  Percent change  Percent 
in number of  in number of  change 
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NOTE:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance at the 95% 
level. 
sistently greater than unity. The lagged county employment variable is 
significant in all but one regression and is always positive. In the man- 
ufacturing regression  it  is generally greater than  unity,  while in the 
retailing-services  sector regressions, it is always less than unity.  The 
tax sensitivity variable has the expected negative sign in the manufac- 
turing  regressions,  but  is  positive  in  the  retailing-service  sector 
regressions. 
In conclusion, the empirical results provide support for the hypoth- 
esis that property taxes have a significant negative effect on firm activity 
levels in the services and retailing sector. A decrease of one percentage 
point in the property tax rate, about the change that occurred in Cal- 
ifornia after Proposition  13, is associated with  an increase of 6%  in 
number of firms, 9% in number of employees, and 15% in payroll. The 
results  suggest that the property tax drop also caused wages to rise 
slightly in these sectors, by about 1.5%. However, the study did not 
find any significant effect of property taxes on firm activity levels for 
manufacturing firms.  It seems possible that these firms adjust to tax 
change only with a longer lag than the four years reflected in the data, 
perhaps because they have capital invested in their current locations 
that would decline substantially in value if moved. Retailing and service 106  Michelle J. White 
firms, in contrast, are more likely to be able to pick up their capital 
and take it with them. 
Notes 
I.  Proposition 13 exempted school district debt service obligations contracted before 
1978 from the 1%  property tax levy. These amounts are added to the basic property tax. 
2.  See Isard (1956). A recent reference is Oster (1979). 
3.  See White (1976) and Moomaw (1980). 
4.  See Oakland (1978) and Wasylenko (1981b) for surveys of the empirical literature 
and further references. 
5.  See White (1979), which develops a theory of how governments respond to ex- 
ogenously imposed tax cuts by reducing spending on various services depending on the 
substitutability of private for public inputs in producing “quasi-public goods.’’ 
6. These data are published annually by the Bureau of the Census. 
7. I am grateful to Jeff Reynolds, Statistical Research and Consulting Division, Cal- 
ifornia State Board of Equalization, and to Howard Chernick for providing data. 
8.  Before Proposition  13, state guidelines called for an assessed valueimarket ratio of 
.25, but many counties had lower ratios. The equalized property tax rates are the product 
of the assessed value/market value ratio and the statutory tax rate. 
9. Obtained from the State Board of Equalization. 
10. Several other fiscal variables were also tried, with similar results. These included 
the percent increase in total county expenditure over the period  1977-81  and the level 
of total government revenue per capita in 1977. 
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Comment  Sharon Bernstein Megdal 
Michelle White examines the outcome of a natural experiment, Cali- 
fornia’s implementation of Proposition  13, in her study of the effect of 
property taxes on firm location. The underlying premise is that firms’ 
location decisions are influenced by a host of factors, including pro- 
duction and transportation costs and taxes. The distribution of business 
activity over a region will change as  the relative costs of doing business 
change. If  we are interested in studying changes in business activity 
relative to some base, as is White, we can do so without measuring 
those factors that remain  constant over the period  of interest. It is 
reasonable for White to assume that relative production and transpor- 
tation costs within the state of California were not affected by imple- 
mentation of Proposition  13. This assumption allows her to model in- 
tercounty variation in business activity without specifying a complete 
model of firm location behavior. 
It  is evident from White’s literature  survey that there is no set of 
consistent results regarding the effect of taxes on firm location.  The 
studies suggest that taxes do not appear to be an important determinant 
of choice of location when a firm is deciding among different regions, 
but  they  may be of some importance when a firm selects a location 
within a region. 
White’s theoretical discussion, though lengthy, is rather peripheral 
to the empirical portion  of the paper.  I  say this because she offers 
alternative  theoretical  models  and  predictions,  only  some of  which 
are  consistent  with  the  central  empirical  hypothesis  that  activity 
growth rates will be higher where property tax decreases are greater. 
Given  the  sometimes  similar  and  sometimes ambiguous  predictions 
and the incongruity of some of the models, I  would have liked some 
insight as to which  model  she thought  most appropriately  described 
the pre-Proposition  13  situation  in  California.  She then  could  have 
discussed the empirical  findings  in  the context of the predictions  of 
the  “preferred”  theoretical  model.  A  discussion  of the relative  ad- 
vantages  and  disadvantages of  the  three  measures of  business ac- 
tivity  used  would  also have  been  helpful.  If  the interest is in  mod- 
eling the outcome of firm  location choices, the first dependent variable 
(the number  of  establishments)  would  be  preferred. If  the  interest 
is  in  modeling business  activity  in  general, on the other hand, per- 
haps  one  of  the  other two  measures better  captures  the  relevant 
magnitudes. 
Sharon Bernstein Megdal is  serving as a commissioner on the Arizona Corporation 
Commission. She is on leave from her position as assistant professor of economics at 
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White’s results are largely consistent with her hypotheses. Although 
her simple model does not explain a large proportion of the variation 
of the dependent variables, the results are quite reasonable both qual- 
itatively and quantitatively. The paper represents a good first attempt 
at studying a complex issue; however,  I would  have liked more dis- 
cussion and interpretation of the findings. The author presents a menu 
of theoretical models but does not select a model from that menu. She 
then presents several regression equations but offers the reader little 
in the way of interpretation of the results. Hence, the remainder of my 
comments are devoted to a discussion  of her model and results, fo- 
cusing on my reasons for finding the results quite reasonable but also 
pointing out why I find interpretation of them somewhat difficult. 
What  I  would  select from  White’s  menu  is a model  with zoning, 
assessments not  equal  to fair markets values,’ a  weak  relationship 
between property taxes paid and services received by firms, and partial 
capitalization of property tax differentials. According to the 1977 Cen- 
sus of  Governments, which reports data for fiscal 1976-77,  a year that 
would be expected to be indicative of the pre-Proposition  13 revenue 
structure, 48.1% of  property taxes raised in California funded school 
expenditures, and 5.8% funded expenditures of special districts. County 
and municipal governments raised  the remaining 32.1 and 14.0% re- 
spectively. Property tax revenues comprised 24% of municipal general 
revenue and 36% of county general revenue. The figures suggest that 
a substantial portion of property tax dollars paid by firms did not fund 
services received by firms and that services received  by firms were 
funded to a significant extent by revenue sources other than the prop- 
erty tax. It is, therefore, difficult to predict the extent of service cut- 
backs experienced by firms as a consequence of Proposition  13. 
Given  these figures,  the post-Proposition  13 distribution  of  state 
surplus funds, and the increased use of user charges and development 
fees,2  I would predict little response of basic industry activity, such as 
manufacturing, to imposition of Proposition  13, which is exactly what 
White found. Predictions regarding the retail and service sectors, the 
other main grouping studied, depend upon predictions regarding basic 
and nonbasic employment and residential location activity. Examina- 
tion of White’s list of service and retail industries reveals industries 
whose activity levels largely depend on residential  location activity, 
which in turn depends on the growth in and dispersion of the population. 
Population growth depends partly on employment growth, while the 
dispersion of the population depends on the relative attractiveness of 
alternative residential locations, as determined by numerous factors, 
including the proximity to employment, housing prices, the extent to 
which the property tax is a benefit tax, and perceptions regarding ser- 
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activity can be made, a more complete model of business and residential 
activity must be specified. Although this endeavor is beyond the scope 
of this discussion, data for the thirty-one counties studied by  White 
reveal some interesting patterns. 
The following statistics are based on county level data (not broken 
down by industry) obtained from County Business Patterns. The av- 
erage four-year growth rate in the number of establishments decreased 
from  16.1% for the 1973-77  period to 11.3% for the 1977-81  period, 
while the corresponding growth rate in number of employees increased 
over that same period from  19.8 to 25.7%. The correlation between 
the 1973-77 growth rate for establishments (employees) and the 1977 
countywide average property tax listed in  White’s table 4.3 is  -0.27 
(-0.22).  The simple correlation between the 1977-81  growth rate for 
establishments  (employees) and  the  1977 property  tax  rate  is  0.20 
(-0.03).  Finally, the correlation between  the  1973-77  and  1977-81 
growth rates for establishments (employees) is 0.56 (0.49). (I have not 
considered changes in payroll,  the third  of  White’s dependent  vari- 
ables, because of  their heavy dependence on the salary mix  of  em- 
ployees.) Whereas there is a positive relationship between growth in 
the number of establishments and the number of employees, the cor- 
relation is not perfect. The data indicate that the growth in the number 
of  establishments may  have  slowed down, but  employment  figures 
suggest that larger-than-average firms opened up and/or existing es- 
tablishments fared well during the 1977-81  period. Proposition 13 was 
implemented just  before  interest  rates  soared  and just  after  rapid 
escalation of  home  prices  in California.  The  high  cost  of  living  in 
California relative to that of other states, uncertainty surrounding the 
general tax and revenue situation,’ and the general slowdown in the 
economy are likely responsible for a slowdown of business movement 
into California. Yet at the same time, the rate of employment growth 
increased.  White’s  regression  results  indicate  that  employment  in- 
creased more rapidly in  pre-Proposition  13 high-tax counties, though 
the manufacturing sector coefficient is not significant. With increased 
employment comes increased demand for the goods and services of 
service and retail trade firms, which are likely to respond  readily to 
increased demand by expansion or entry into local markets. However, 
the  question  to  what  extent  property  taxes  influence  the  location 
decisions of firms is still largely unanswered. So much of the variation 
in  the dependent variables  remains unexplained.  The model has not 
explained the variation in location activity of firms producing goods 
for nonlocal markets, nor has it established that taxes are an important 
determinant of location choices for retail and service firms. The results 
for the latter sectors could be  reflecting residential  location choices 
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The problems in  interpreting White’s results are no different from 
those that arise whenever a simple structure is used to model complex 
phenomena. The results, for the  most part, are consistent with  her 
hypotheses. What is needed for more definitive conclusions is a more 
detailed model of growth and business activity in California. 
I  would  like to discuss some other reasons, some of  which have 
already been alluded to, for the rather poor performance of  the em- 
pirical model in  explaining variation in business activity. First, there 
are problems of data aggregation. The data are at the county level; 
consequently, intracounty variability in the data is masked. In addition, 
the dependent variable includes births, deaths, expansions and con- 
tractions, and relocations within, into, and out of the state. Some of 
these components would be expected to be more sensitive to relative 
property tax rates than others. Another problem is that the time since 
passage of Proposition  13 may not have been long enough for differ- 
ences  in  manufacturing  activity  to  be  revealed.  Manufacturing 
(re)locations are likely to involve substantial lead time.  Some of the 
firm activity in the early part of the 1977-81  period may reflect decisions 
made prior to Proposition 13, while some decisions made in the period 
immediately following its passage  may  not have been  realized  until 
rather late in the  1977-81  period.  Also, the uncertainty surrounding 
the fiscal future of California locales relative to each other and relative 
to those in other states may have led to postponement of  relocation 
and/or expansion decisions. For  example, increases in  user and de- 
velopment fees and the distribution of state surplus revenues lessened 
the immediate impact of Proposition  13. 
White’s assertion that certain attributes of California’s business cli- 
mate could be assumed to be unchanged by Proposition  13 is reason- 
able; however, the business climate of California relative to the rest of 
the United States may have changed over this period. Thus, in addition 
to adjusting for the change in industry activity at the national level, 
controlling for the  level of  industry activity in  California might  be 
necessary. One way of incorporating such changes in a model explain- 
ing intrastate variation in business activity would be to redefine the 
dependent variable in terms of the share of state business activity. One 
could then examine the change in shares over time. 
In summary, I think the question to what extent firm location deci- 
sions depend on property tax rates is still largely unanswered. White’s 
model yields quite reasonable results, but further study is needed. I 
am not yet willing to accept or reject the hypothesis that Proposition 
13’s  realignment of property tax rates has had an impact on firm location 
patterns. It may be a while before  a new equilibrium is reached in 
California. A different data set, model, and/or patience will help shed 
further light on this important question. 112  Michelle J. White 
Notes 
1.  See Oakland (1979, 396). 
2.  See Strauss, Mikels, and Hagman (1982). 
3. For  example, Proposition 4, which limits the growth in annual appropriations of 
state and local governments, was passed by initiative in November  1979, but did  not 
take effect until July 1, 1980. Also, developers found that local jurisdictions could change 
development rules after commitment of funds for public improvements. (See Strauss, 
Mikels,  and  Hagman  [1982].) There  was also uncertainty as to the extent to  which 
worldwide  earnings of  multinational  corporations  would  be taxed under California's 
unitary  tax. Although in Container Corporarion of America  vs. Franchise Tax Board, 
the United  States Supreme Court recently ruled that the worldwide unitary method of 
taxation used by California is constitutional, it is likely that California and other states 
will change their methods of taxing multinational  corporations because this particular 
tax does seem to affect location decisions of multinational firms. 
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